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Plaintiffs/respondents Roger T. and Terrie Lee Sharp 
(collectively "Sharp") hereby submit the following Brief of 
Respondents. 
JURISDICTION OF APPELLATE COURT 
This Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(j) and Rule 42 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. This case was poured-over to the Utah Court 
of Appeals by order of the Utah Supreme Court, dated March 29, 
1990. 
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The sole issue is whether the Honorable David S. Young 
of the trial court clearly abused his discretion in denying the 
Motion to Set Aside Judgment (the "Motion") of 
defendants/appellants Lester D. Baker and Baker Engineers, Inc. 
(collectively "Baker").1 
1
 Baker mis-styles the page immediately preceding his Table of 
Contents as "Appeal from Order Denying Motion to Set Aside Default 
Judgment." The order at issue on this appeal is not one refusing 
to set aside a default judgment but rather one refusing to set 
aside summary judgment which was entered by the trial court in 
Sharp's favor. See Order and Judgment dated June 22, 1989 (R 129-
13 0). ("R " refers to the record on appeal). 
For the convenience of the Court, a copy of the Order and 
Judgment dated June 22, 1989 is attached as Exhibit "1" to the 
Appendix hereto. 
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STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The standard of review on an appeal from the refusal of 
a trial court to set aside a judgment entered by that court is 
whether the trial court clearly abused its discretion in refusing 
to set aside the judgment. See, e.g. . Katz v. Pierce, 732 P. 2d 92, 
93 (Utah 1986); Larsen v. Colina, 684 P.2d 52, 54 (Utah 1984); 
Russell v. Martell, 681 P.2d 1193, 1194-95 (Utah 1984). 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
No constitutional provision, statute, ordinance, rule or 
regulation is determinative of this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
Sharp filed a complaint against Baker alleging that Baker 
had improperly encumbered title to certain real property owned by 
Sharp when Baker caused a Notice of Lien to be recorded against the 
property. (R 2-6). Sharp subsequently moved for summary judgment, 
which was granted. (R 65-91; 96). Baker did not appeal from the 
summary judgment. Rather, Baker chose to file a motion seeking to 
have the trial court set aside the summary judgment. (R 145). The 
trial court denied Baker's Motion. (R 164, 168). 
Sharp.brf (mfj) 
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On this appeal, Baker seeks reversal of the trial court's 
September 19, 1989 Order Denying Defendants' Motion to Set Aside 
Judgment (the "Order") (R 168).2 Sharp seeks affirmance of that 
Order. 
B. Statement of Relevant Facts. 
Sharp filed a complaint3 against Baker alleging that 
Baker had improperly encumbered title to certain real property 
owned by Sharp when Baker caused a Notice of Lien to be recorded 
against the property. (R 2-6). 
Subsequently, Sharp moved for summary judgment and filed 
a memorandum of points and authorities and affidavits in support 
thereof. (R 65-91). 
After the time had expired for Baker to oppose the motion 
or to seek additional time to do so, Sharp requested the trial 
court to decide Sharp's Motion for Summary Judgment. (R 94-95). 
On May 24, 1989, the trial court properly granted Sharp's 
motion for summary judgment and requested that counsel for Sharp 
prepare the necessary findings and order and submit them in 
compliance with the local court rules. (R 96). 
2
 For the convenience of the Court, a copy of the trial 
court's September 19, 1989 Order Denying Defendants' Motion to Set 
Aside Judgment is attached as Exhibit "2" to the Appendix hereto. 
3
 The complaint was initially brought in the name of Roger T. 
Sharp but was subsequently amended to add as a party plaintiff 
Terrie Lee Sharp, Roger Sharp's spouse. 
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Counsel for Sharp prepared Proposed Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and a Proposed Order and Judgment as instructed 
by the trial court and served copies thereof upon Baker. (R 129-
137) . Baker failed to object to those Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and the Order and Judgment. 
On June 22, 1989, the trial court entered the Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law and the Order and Judgment. (R 129-
137) . 
Over three weeks later, in mid-July 1989, Baker moved to 
set aside the trial court's Order granting summary judgment. (R 
145)/ Sharp opposed Bakers' Motion to Set Aside Judgment. (R 
146-151). 
On August 23, 1989, the trial court denied Baker's Motion 
(R 164; 168). Baker now appeals from the trial court's denial of 
Baker's Motion to Set Aside Judgment. 
4
 At the same time, Baker filed an objection to the Order and 
Judgment and to the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law "on the 
basis that Defendants have tendered to the Court a Motion to Set 
Aside Judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure.1' (R 140). That objection, however, was untimely. See 
Utah Code of Judicial Administration Rule 4-504(2) (requiring that 
objections to proposed findings, judgments and orders be submitted 
to the court and to opposing counsel within five days after 
service). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Baker does not appeal from the summary judgment entered 
by the trial court in Sharp's favor. Baker only appeals from the 
trial court's denial of Baker's Motion to Set Aside Judgment. This 
Court should affirm the trial court's ruling and dismiss Baker's 
appeal for several reasons. First, Baker has failed to cite in his 
Brief to this Court to the record or to marshall evidence in 
support of his claims as required by the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. Second, the trial court did not abuse its discretion 
in denying Baker's Motion to Set Aside Judgment. The trial court 
considered the arguments of the respective parties regarding 
whether the judgment entered in Sharp's favor should be set aside 
(see R 168) and determined not to do so. (R 168). The record of 
the proceedings in the trial court fails to demonstrate any abuse 
of discretion. Finally, Baker has failed to present any law or 
evidence in support of his appeal. The reasons advanced by Baker 
as to why Baker's Motion to Set Aside Judgment should have been 
granted are inadequate for setting aside a judgment. 
This Court should affirm the trial court's Order denying 
Baker's Motion. 
Sharp.brf (mfj) 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THIS COURT NEED NOT REACH THE MERITS OF BAKER'S APPEAL BECAUSE 
BAKER HAS NOT SUPPORTED THE FACTS SET FORTH IN HIS BRIEF WITH 
CITATIONS TO THE RECORD AS REQUIRED BY THIS COURT'S RULES. 
In Trees v. Lewis, 738 P.2d 612 (Utah 1987), the Utah 
Supreme Court stated as follows: 
We need not reach the merits of this dispute for several 
reasons. First, [appellant] has not supported the facts 
set forth in his brief with citations to the record as 
required by Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(6) 
(Supp. 1986). In State v. Tucker, 657 P.2d 755, 757 
(Utah 1982), we interpreted Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 
75(p)(2)(2)(d), the forerunner of Utah Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 24(a)(6), and stated: 
This Court will assume the correctness of the 
judgment below if counsel on appeal does not 
comply with the requirements of Rule 
75(p)(2)(2)(d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
as to making a concise statement of facts and 
citation of the pages in the record where they 
are supported. 
(Citations omitted). 
Trees, 738 P.2d at 612-13. 
In Mountain States Broadcasting Co. v. Neale, 783 P. 2d 
551 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), this Court noted: 
In order to challenge a trial court's findings of fact, 
a party "must marshal1 the evidence in support of the 
findings and then demonstrate that despite this evidence, 
the trial court's findings are so lacking in support as 
to be 'against the clear weight of the evidence,' thus 
making them clearly erroneous.'" In re Bartell, 776 P.2d 
885, 886 (Utah 1989) (emphasis added) (quoting State v. 
Walker, 743 P.2d 191. 193 (Utah 1987)). See also, e.g. , 
Scharf v. BMG Corp. . 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985); 
Henderson v. For-Shor Co., 757 P.2d 465, 468 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988), Appellants often overlook or disregard this 
heavy burden. When the duty to marshal is not properly 
-6-
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discharged, ve refuse to consider the merits of 
challenges to the findings and accept the findings as 
valid," (Citations omitted). 
Mountain States Broadcasting Co. , 783 P. 2d at 553 (emphasis added). 
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(7) presently 
provides that "[all] statements of fact and references to the 
proceedings below shall be supported by citations to the record." 
Rule 24(a)(9) states that the appellant's "argument shall contain 
the contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the 
issues presented, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and 
parts of the record relied on." Baker's Brief before this Court 
is not only devoid of citations to the record, it also fails to 
marshall any evidence in support of Baker's arguments that the 
trial court somehow abused its discretion. Indeed, Baker makes no 
reference whatsoever to the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
(R 132-137) made by the trial court, which support both the 
judgment entered in Sharp's favor and the trial court's refusal to 
set aside that judgment. 
Because Baker has failed to comply with the applicable 
rules of this Court, as set forth above, this Court need not reach 
the merits of this appeal and should assume the correctness of the 
trial court's Order denying Baker's Motion. 
Sharp brf (mfj) 
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II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO 
SET A8IDE THE JUDGMENT ENTERED IN SHARP'S FAVOR. 
Even if this Court determines to reach the merits of the 
appeal before it, this Court should affirm the trial court's order 
denying Baker's Motion because the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in refusing to set aside the judgment entered in Sharp's 
favor. 
A. The Trial Court's Order Denying Baker's Motion Should not 
be Set Aside Absent a Clear Abuse of Discretion. 
In Larsen v. Colina. 684 P.2d 52 (Utah 1984), the Utah 
Supreme Court stated the standard for reviewing a trial court's 
decision regarding setting aside a judgment pursuant to Utah Rule 
of Civil Procedure 60(b): 
A trial court has discretion in determining whether a 
movant has shown "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or 
excusable neglect," and this Court will reverse the trial 
court's ruling only when there has been an abuse of 
discretion. 
Larsen, 684 P.2d at 54 (citing Russell v. Martell, 681 P.2d 1193 
(Utah 1984); Heath v. Mower, 597 P.2d 855 (Utah 1979); Airkem 
Intermountain. Inc. v. Parker, 30 Utah 2d 65, 513 P.2d 429 (1973)). 
In Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92, 93 (Utah 1986), the 
Supreme Court further expounded: 
[BJefore we will interfere with the trial court's 
exercise of discretion, abuse of that discretion must be 
clearly shown. Russell v. Martell, 681 P.2d 1193 (Utah 
1984) . That some basis may exist to set aside the 
[judgment] does not require the conclusion that the court 
Sharp.brf (mfj) 
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abused its discretion in refusing to do so when facts and 
circumstances support the refusal. 
Katz, 732 P.2d at 93 (emphasis added and citation omitted). 
Baker has identified no facts or evidence to support 
Baker's argument that the trial court abused its discretion in 
denying Baker's Motion. Indeed, Baker has not even argued in his 
brief that the trial court somehow abused its discretion in denying 
Baker's Motion.5 The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law made 
by the trial court, which are not attacked on appeal, alone 
conclusively demonstrate the propriety of the trial court's refusal 
to set aside the judgment that was entered in Sharp's favor. 
The record in the trial court is absolutely devoid of any 
evidence of abuse of discretion by the trial court in denying 
Bakers' Motion to Set Aside Judgment. This Court therefore should 
affirm the trial court's Order (R 168) denying Baker's Motion. 
B. Baker Failed to Satisfy Rule 60(b) in Seeking to have the 
Judgment Entered in Sharp's Favor Set Aside. 
The Utah Supreme Court has defined "excusable neglect" 
under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1) as the "exercise of 
'due diligence7 by a reasonably prudent person under similar 
circumstances." Mini Spas, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n of Utah, 73 3 
As previously noted, Baker did not appeal from the Order 
and Judgment (R 129-130) entered in Sharp's favor, including the 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R 132-137) made by the 
trial court with respect to its grant of Sharp's motion for summary 
j udgment. 
Sharp.brf (mfj) 
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P.2d 130, 132 (Utah 1987). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
60(b)(1), which is nearly identical to the Utah Rule, "[a] 
negligent mistake, that is one evincing a lack of due care, is not 
a proper ground for relief." Western Transport. Co. v. E. I. Du 
Pont de Nemours & Co., 682 F.2d 1233, 1236 (7th Cir. 1982). See 
Mini Spas, 733 P. 2d at 132 (untimely response filed as a result of 
notice being inadvertently stuck together in a drawer not 
sufficient to excuse untimely protest); Airkem Intermountain, Inc. 
v. Parker. 30 Utah 2d 65, 513 P.2d 429, 431 (1973) (showing of due 
diligence required with respect to Rule 60(b) motion). 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it 
determined that Baker's conduct did not rise to the level of 
"mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect" articulated 
by Utah courts and contemplated by Rule 60(b). Indeed, Baker 
admitted at the trial court level that Sharp's Motion for Summary 
Judgment was timely received by Baker's counsel and acknowledged 
that "[w]hile the appropriate response by Defendants' counsel when 
faced with difficult time constraints should have been to seek an 
extension from Plaintiff's counsel . . ." (R 141-142), "none was 
sought." (Id.) At best, defendants' conduct in the trial court 
constituted negligence, which is not a proper ground for relief 
under Rule 60(b)(1). 
Sharp.brf (mfj) 
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Simply stated, Baker's actions in the trial court did not 
rise to the level of the exercise of due diligence by a reasonably 
prudent person under the circumstances as required by the Utah 
Supreme Court. The trial court duly considered the respective 
arguments of Baker and Sharp with regard to setting aside the 
judgment entered in Sharp's favor and exercised its discretion not 
to do so. The trial court did not clearly abuse its discretion in 
making that determination. This Court should affirm the trial 
court's Order (R 168) denying Baker's Motion. 
III. BAKER FAILS TO PRESENT ANY LAW OR EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT 
OF HIS APPEAL. 
In his Brief to this Court, Baker relies almost 
exclusively on the assertion that his counsel at the trial court 
level was negligent or did not properly perform his duties. As set 
forth above, however, negligence is not a proper ground for relief 
under Rule 60(b)(1). Further, the courts of this State have 
rejected similar arguments on numerous occasions in the past. See, 
e.g., Russell v. Martell. 681 P.2d 1193, 1195 (Utah 1984) (neglect 
by appellant's attorney attributable to appellant through 
principles of agency); Deschamps v. Pulley, 784 P.2d 471, 474-75 
n.2 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (citing cases); Walker v. Carlson, 740 
Sharp.brf (mfj) 
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P.2d 1372, 1375 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (neglect on part of counsel 
did not justify setting aside judgment).6 
The only case law cited by Baker in support of his appeal 
relates to the review on appeal of the grant of summary judgment 
by a lower court. That issue is not before this Court because 
Baker did not appeal from the trial court's grant of summary 
judgment. Baker only appealed from the trial court's refusal to 
set aside the summary judgment. 
IV. BAKER'S CONDUCT HAS BEEN THAT OF CONTINUOUS AND REPEATED DELAY 
AND DISREGARD FOR THE RULES OF THE TRIAL COURT AND OF THE 
APPELLATE COURTS. 
The record in the trial court reflects Baker's continuous 
and repeated delays and his disregard for the rules of practice of 
the courts of this State. Baker apparently purports to justify 
such conduct by arguing in his Brief to this Court that "the rules 
. . . are too often now just used as chance [sic] to take advantage 
of busy schedules and errors in calendaring by ambitious attorneys 
6
 See also, e.g. , Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92, 94-95 (Utah 
1986); Gardiner & Gardiner Builders v. Swapp, 656 P.2d 429, 430 
(Utah 1982) (court rejected argument that negligence of attorney 
not imputed to client) ; First Security Bank of Utah. N.A. v. 
Felger, 658 F. Supp. 175, 179 (D. Utah 1987) (applying Utah law). 
Sharp. t>rf (mf j ) 
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and are not used to further the cause of justice or fairness" 
Baker's Brief at 6.7 This argument obviously is without merit. 
In his Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to 
Set Aside Judgment (R 146-151) filed in the trial court, Sharp set 
forth in detail why Baker failed to establish proper grounds for 
setting aside the judgment entered in Sharp's favor, including 
applicable case law and a chronology of events that had transpired 
with respect to the case. At that time, Sharp pointed out to the 
trial court that "defendants [had] consistently ignored the 
applicable rules of [the district] court and ha[d] unilaterally 
determined that they can establish both the rules and the timetable 
in th[at] action." Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion 
to Set Aside Judgment at 3 (R 148). 
On appeal, Baker has continued his pattern of delay and 
disregard of applicable court rules. In his Memorandum of Points 
and Authorities in Support of Motion to Dismiss Appeal,8 Sharp set 
forth in detail Baker's repeated failure to abide by his 
representations to this Court and by the rules of this Court. 
Indeed, Baker failed to file his Brief in a timely fashion despite 
7
 There has been no allegation either in the trial court or on 
appeal of an error in calendaring by Baker. 
8
 For the convenience of the Court, a copy of Sharp's 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion to 
Dismiss Appeal is attached as Exhibit "3" to the Appendix hereto. 
Sharp.brf (mfj) 
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this Court's explicit warning (see Exhibit "D" to Exhibit "3" 
hereto) that such action could result in Baker's appeal being 
dismissed.9 
This Court should not tolerate repeated disregard of 
applicable court rules. Baker's conduct on appeal reflects a 
pattern of noncompliance with the rules of this Court. Such 
disregard and noncompliance constitute an additional and 
independent justification for the denial by this Court of Baker's 
appeal and the affirmance of the trial court's order denying 
Baker's Motion. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the above, Sharp respectfully urges this Court 
to affirm Judge Young's "Order Denying Defendants' Motion to Set 
Aside Judgment." (R 168). 
Sharp also requests that this Court award Sharp costs, 
including reasonable attorneys' fees, incurred in responding to 
Baker's appeal. [See Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 and the trial 
court's Order and Judgment (R 129-130) awarding reasonable 
attorneys fees to Sharp.]. 
9
 Despite Baker's failure to oppose Sharp's Motion to Dismiss 
Appeal, Sharp's motion was denied. 
Sharp.brf (mfj) 
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Submitted this )r\Tv^day of September 1990. 
KIMBALL, PARR, WADDOUPS, BROWN & GEE 
^ W ^ C T S By_ JG*, UCWY\LQJ 
Clark Waddoups 
Mark F. James 
Attorneys for plaintiffs/respondents 
Roger T. Sharp and Terrie Lee Sharp 
Sharp.brf (mfj) 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing "Brief of Plaintiffs/Respondents" was mailed via U.S, 
mail, first class postage prepaid, this \oj^^ day of September, 
1990, to the following: 
Don L. Bybee, Esq. 
Attorney for Defendants 
2805 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
WeJ, 3 j CKW&J^J 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ROGER T. SHARP and TERRIE LEE 
SHARP, 
Plaintiffs/Respondents, 
vs. 
LESTER D. BAKER, an individual, 
BAKER ENGINEERS, INC., a Utah 
corporation, 
Defendants/Appellants. 
Case No. 900185-CA 
APPENDIX TO BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS/RESPONDENTS 
Appeal from the Order of the Third Judicial District 
Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, Denying 
DefendantsVAPPellants/ Motion to Set Aside Judgment, 
District Court Civil No. 890900028 PR 
Honorable David S. Young, District Judge, presiding 
Don L. Bybee, Esq. 
2805 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Clark Waddoups (3975) 
Mark F. James (5295) 
KIMBALL, PARR, WADDOUPS, BROWN 
& GEE 
185 South State Street 
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Telephone: (801) 532-7840 
Attorney for 
Defendants/Appellants 
Attorneys for 
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Clark Waddoups (3975) 
Mark F. James (5295) 
KIMBALL, PARR, CROCKETT & WADDOUPS 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
185 South State Street, Suite 1300 
Post Office Box 11019 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
Telephone: (801) 532-7840 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH frwqssft 
ROGER T. SHARP, an individual, 
Plaintiff, 
-v-
LESTER D. BAKER, an individual, 
and BAKER ENGINEERS, INC., 
a Utah corporation, 
Defendants. 
^-M-^-^S^cw^ 
[PROPOSED> 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 890900028PR 
Judge David S. Young 
Plaintiff Roger Sharp's Motions to Amend* the Complaint and to 
Add an Additional Plaintiff and for Summary Judgment were submitted 
for decision of the Court, the Honorable David S. Young, District 
Judge, presiding, on May 17, 1989. Pursuant to the findings of 
fact and conclusions of law filed together herewith, the Court, 
being fully advised in the premises, rules as follows: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED: 
1. The motion to amend the complaint to add Terrie Lee Sharp 
as an additional plaintiff is granted. 
2. Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment is granted. 
S/SHA-P011 jlh 
3. The Notice of Lien dated and recorded on or about October 
5, 1988, No. 4684701, with the Salt Lake County Recorder against 
plaintiffs' property located at 5757 Holiday Boulevard in Salt Lake 
County, Utah, described more particularly as follows: 
BEG 203.35 FT N & 243 FT W FR SE COR OF SW 1/4 OF NW 1/4, 
SEC 14, T 2S, R IE, S L M; N 4 47' E 240.2 FT; W 192 FT ; 
S 239.3 FT; E 172 FT TO BEG. 1 AC 4763-0408 5312-0883 
5528-0254 
is hereby released and removed. 
4. Plaintiffs Roger T. Sharp and Terrie Lee Sharp shall 
recover from defendants Lester D. Baker and Baker Engineering, 
Inc., a Utah corporation, the sum of $4,640.00, plus an additional 
amount of $ —o — , from June 14, 1989 until the date of 
the entry of the Court order herein, as a penalty allowed by Utah 
Code Annotated §38-1-24 for refusing to remove the Notice of Lien 
after proper demand was made. 
5. Plaintiffs are entitled to recover a reasonable 
attorney's fee pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §78-27-56. 
Plaintiffs may submit by affidavit evidence of what their 
reasonable attorney's fee has been in connection with this matter. 
DATED this s?£ day of June,^1989. 
BY THE COURT: 
lonorable David) S. /fpung 
D i s t r i c t Jux; 
- 2 -
S/SHA-P011 jlh 
Tab 2 
Clark Waddoups (3975) 
Mark F. James (5295) 
KIMBALL, PARR, CROCKETT & WADDOUPS 
185 South State Street, Suite 1300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
Telephone: (801) 532-7840 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
cv-
SE? 1 9 1SS9 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROGER T. SHARP, an individual 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LESTER D. BAKER, an individual, 
BAKER ENGINEERS, INC., a Utah 
corporation, 
Defendant. 
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION TO SET ASIDE 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 890900028PR 
Judge David S. Young 
Defendants have moved the Court to set aside the Court's 
Order and Judgment dated June 22, 1989. 
The Court, having reviewed the pleadings, and good cause 
appearing therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED thai defendants' Motion to Set Aside 
Judgment is denied. 
DATED: September ^ -1 ( , 1989. 
Hon. District ifudde Qa^ id S.Young 
Tab 3 
Clark Waddoups (3975) 
Mark F. James (5295) 
KIMBALL, PARR, CROCKETT & WADDOUPS 
185 South State Street, Suite 1300 
Post Office Box 11019 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
Telephone: (801) 53 2-7840 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ROGER T. SHARP and TERRIE LEE 
SHARP, 
Plaintiffs/Respondents, 
vs. 
LESTER D. BAKER, an individual, 
BAKER ENGINEERS, INC, a Utah 
corporation, 
Defendants/Appellants 
INTRODUCTION 
Defendants/Appellants' appeal of the lower court's 
September 19, 1989 Order Denying Defendants7 Motion to Set Aside 
Judgment should be dismissed. Defendants/Appellants have wholly 
failed and refused to comply with this Court's scheduling 
requirements and instructions with respect to the appeal. 
Defendants/Appellants therefore should be precluded from further 
delaying final resolution of this matter. 
AUG 10 1990 
;-.v.rv T Uocrmn 
C\3t\ ci m* Court 
than Caurt ** Apj«al3 
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND 
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL 
} ^ 
Case No. 900185-CA 
DISCUSSION 
Defendants/Appellants were instructed to file their 
briefs in support of the above-captioned appeal on or before April 
16, 1990.1 On April 16, 1990, Defendants/Appellants sought a 
thirty (30) day extension to file their briefs and offered as the 
sole justification for that extension that circumstances in the 
practice of their counsel had not allowed counsel to prepare 
Defendants/Appellants' brief.2 On May 16, 1990, Defendants/ 
Appellants again sought an extension—twenty (20) days—to file 
their briefs. The extension was sought on the ground that their 
legal counsel "had not been able to prepare the necessary brief, 
etc." On each occasion, Defendants/Appellants failed to file 
their briefs on or before the date of the requested extension. 
Further, Plaintiffs/Appellants are not aware that any extension was 
ever granted by the Court. 
Despite having requested two extensions to file their 
briefs, Defendants/Appellants still did not file briefs in support 
of their appeal by June 5, 1990, the date last requested by 
Defendants/Appellants for filing their briefs. Finally, on July 
A
 See Exhibit "A" hereto. 
2
 See Exhibit "B" hereto. 
3
 See Exhibit "C" heretd. 
4
 See Exhibit "C". 
2 
s/sharp-app (sj) 
26, 1990, the Deputy Clerk of this Court informed Defendants/ 
Appellants that if they did not file their briefs by August 3, 
1990, the above-captioned appeal would be presented to this Court 
5 . . . . 
for dismissal. Defendants/Appellants again failed to file their 
briefs as instructed.5 As of August 9, 1990, counsel for 
Plaintiffs/Appellees have not been served with briefs from 
Defendants/Appellants. 
Defendants/Appellants filed the above-captioned appeal 
and have the burden properly and diligently to pursue it. They 
have failed to do so. Moreover, Defendants/Appellants have 
disregarded the instructions and requirements of this Court. In 
light of Defendants/Appellants' conduct, and given 
Defendants/Appellants' pattern of lateness and/or failure in 
responding to this Court's instructions' and requirements, 
Plaintiffs/Appellees respectfully request that the above-captioned 
appeal be dismissed as set forth in the July 26, 1990 letter 
(Exhibit "C") from the Court to counsel for Defendants/Appellants. 
Plaintiffs/Appellants further request that they be awarded the 
JSee Exhibit "D" hereto. 
In a telephone conversation with Ms. Janice Ray, Deputy 
Clerk of the Court of Appeals, Ms. Ray informed counsel for 
Plaintiffs/Respondents that Defendants/Appellants had shoved briefs 
under the doors of her office apparently sometime after close of 
business on August 3, 1990. Ms. Ray stated that she found the 
briefs on August 6, 1990 and would treat them as having been filed 
on that date. 
3 
s/sharp-app (sj) 
costs and attorneys fees that they have incurred with respect to 
the above-captioned appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs/Respondents request 
that Defendants/Appellants7 appeal be dismissed and that 
Plaintiffs/Respondents be awarded costs and attorneys fees incurred 
by Plaintiffs/Respondents with respect to the above-captioned 
appeal. 
DATED this lC^£\ day of August 1990. 
KIMBALL, PARR, CROCKETT & WADDOUPS 
iY\aA,\J. 0—^w 
Clark Waddoups J 
Mark F. James (y 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellees 
s/sharp-app (sj) 
4 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION 
TO DISMISS APPEAL was hand-delivered this iff** day of August, 
1990, to the following: 
Don L. Bybe§ 
2805 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
s/s-^rp-app <sj) 
5 
Tab A 
SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
March 2, 1990 
OFFICE OF THE CLERK 
Clark Waddoups, Esq. 
Mark F. James, Esq, 
KIMBALL, PARR, CROCKETT & WADDOUPS 
185 South State Street, Suite 1300 
P.O. Box 11019 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
Roger T. Sharp, an individual, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
L.D. Baker, an individual, 
and Baker Engineers, Inc., a 
Utah corporation, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
THIS DAY, record index on appeal filed. Appellant's brief is 
due Ayril 16, 1990, The record in this case may be withdrawn from 
the district court only upon written request of the attorney of 
record. 
Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk 
No. 890451 
EXHIBIT "A" 
TabB 
TERRY C. TURNER (USB 3299) 
5505 South 900 East 
Suite 220 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Telephone: (801) 2 61-3888 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OP APPEALS 
ROGER T. SHARP and 
TERRIE LEE SHARP, 
Plaintiffs/Respondents 
vs. 
LESTER D. BAKER, an individual, 
BAKER ENGINEERS, INC-, a Utah 
corporation, 
Defendants/Appellants 
Motion for Extension of 
Time for Filing Brief. 
Case #900185-CA 
Comes now Defendants/Appellants and move the above-entitled 
Court for an order extending the time for the filing of their brief 
for 30 days to May 16, 1990. Defendants/Appellants1 Motion is 
based upon counsels affidavit, which is attached hereto, marked 
as Exhibit "A" and by this reference made a part hereof. 
Dated this /$*> day of v^rtiArff 1990. 
EXHIBIT MB" 
Certificate of Service 
I hereby, certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of +he — 
Motion for Ext^hsion of Time and Order, postage prepaid this /fo^*» 
day of //AZ/hJC 1990, to the following: 
Clark Waddups, Esq. 
Mark F. James, Esq. 
Attorneys for Respondent 
185 South State St., Suite 1300 
P.O. Box 11019 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
TERRY C. TURNER (USB 3299) 
5505 South 900 East 
Suite 220 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Telephone: (801) 261-3888 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OP APPEALS 
ROGER T. SHARP and 
TERRIE LEE SHARP, 
Plaintiffs/Respondents ] 
vs. 
LESTER D. BAKER, an individualf ] 
BAKER ENGINEERS, INC., a Utah ] 
corporation, 
Defendants/Appellants 
Affidavit of Counsel 
\ A. \\A—* 
i Case t 900185-CA \ P 
I, Terry C. Turner, having been duly-sworn"- upon my oath, 
depose and state as follows: 
1) I am an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of 
Utah. 
2) I am counsel to Defendants/Appellants. 
3) This is the first extension of time sought in this matter 
for filing of Appellants1 brief. 
4) Circumstances in my practice have not allowed me to 
adequately prepare Appellants1 brief and a 30 day extension is 
necessary. 
Dated this M. day of 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this ^ L ^ d a y of 
Commission Expires: 
TabC 
DON L. BYBEE #529 
At torney f o r A p p e l l a n t 
2305 South S t a t e S t r e e t 
S a l t l a k e C i t y , Utah 84115 
Telephone: 436-2054 
IN B E CCUF^ OF APPEAIS OF TIE STATE <T UTAH 
ccoOcco 
R0C23* T. SHARP, : 
P l a i n t i f f - R e s p o n d e n t 
v s . 
IESTER D. EAKEP dfca BAKER ENGINEERS 
Defendant-Arx^ellant 
APPEARANCE OF COUNSEL 
RETOEST FOR EXTENSION 
C i v i l § 89090002S PP. 
Aj^eal No. 900135-CA 
AND 
TO FILE 
4»W 
OCHES NOW Don L. Eybee and enters his appearance as attorney for 
the Defendant-Appelant (assigning Terry C. Turner has filed his withdrawal as 
vas requested because of a conflict of interest). 
It is respectfully requested that Defendant be permitted 20 days 
to file the docunnents necessary to this time as counsel has not received 
the file from former counsel and has not been able to prepare the necessary 
brief/ etc. 
DATED this 16th day of May, 1990. 
^ / < / _ 
DON L. BYBEE 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
This is to certify I served the foregoinq on the Plaintiff by mailing 
a true copy to his attorney Clark Waddops at P.O. Box 11019/ Salt Late City 
Utah and to Terry C. Turner, defendants former attorney at 5505 South 900 East 
#220f Murray, Utah 84118 postage prepaid this Kay 16, 1990. 
f 
DC*J L. BYBEE" 
EXHIBIT "C" 
TabD 
Richard C Davidson 
Presiding judge 
Russell W. Bench 
Associate Presiding judge 
Judith M. Billings 
Judge 
Regnal W. GaHf 
Judge 
Pamela T. Greenwood 
judge 
Norman H. Jackson 
Judge 
Gregory- K. Orme 
Judge 
Utah Court of Appeals 
400 Midtown Plaza 
230 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
801-S3J-6800 
July 26, 1990 
Don L. Bybee 
Attorney at Law 
2805 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
In Re: 
Vl/OF V?V 
Marv T. Noonan 
Clerk of the Court 
Roger T. Sharp, an individual, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. Case No, 900185-CA 
Lester D. Baker, an individual, 
and Baker Engineers, Inc., 
a Utah corporation, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Dear Mr. Bybee: 
On May 30, 1990, the Court received an appearance of 
counsel and a request for extension to file. Our procedure 
is to accept a motion, stipulation, and proposed order to 
present to the Court for an extension, as-we relayed by 
telephone call to your office. As a result, the 
appellant's brief is new in default. Your briel and seven 
copies must be received in this Court by August 3, 1990. 
If you fail to file your brief by August 3rd, the case 
will be presented to the Court for dismissal. 
Sincerely, 
Janice Ray 
Deputy Clerk 
cc: Clark Waddoups and Mark F. James 
EXHIBIT*"D 
